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Eyal Benvenisti. The International Law of  Occupation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2nd edn, 2012. Pp. 416. £70. 00. ISBN: 9780199588893.
The first edition of  Eyal Benvenisti’s The International Law of  Occupation, published in 1993, 
was the first thorough treatment of  occupation law to appear in English in 30 years. Not since 
Gerhard van Glahn’s volume of  1957 had a scholar comprehensively surveyed this critical area 
of  law. 1 An update was long overdue. The seemingly clear rules of  the 1907 Hague Regulations 
and 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention appeared to be receding in importance, as few states in 
the post-World War II period acknowledged their status as occupiers; Israel’s prolonged occu-
pation of  the Palestinian territories challenged the assumption of  occupation as a temporary 
phenomenon; few governments ousted in recent occupations went into exile to await a return 
to power, thus calling into question occupation law’s focus on protecting the prerogatives of  
the ‘de jure regime’; and occupiers had seemingly honoured the ‘conservationist principle’ – the 
limitation on an occupier’s legislative authority most famously embodied in Article 43 of  the 
Hague Regulations – mostly in the breach. States themselves provided little help in making sense 
of  these and other developments. The discussions of  occupation law in the US and UK military 
manuals, for example, had not been updated since the late 1950s.2 With the striking exception 
of  Israel in the Palestinian territories, occupation law appeared to be receding from relevance.
Now Benvenisti has published a second edition, adding almost 150 pages of  text and several 
new chapters covering topics not addressed in the first edition. One is tempted to say that the 
second edition is even more overdue than the first. If  the first edition sought to rescue occu-
pation law from irrelevance, the second edition seeks to make sense of  an explosion in state 
practice, judicial opinions, UN-sponsored activity, emerging cognate doctrines, and scholarly 
commentary, all of  which have placed occupation law at the centre of  some of  the thorniest 
(and most politicized) debates in contemporary international law. Occupation law has certainly 
re-emerged as a first-tier topic for international lawyers, but some of  its content borders on the 
incoherent. The second edition ambitiously seeks to systematize this venerable body of  law sud-
denly embedded in a very different legal era from that of  its origin.
One useful way to understand the need for a second edition, and the scope of  the task 
Benvenisti has undertaken, is to set out the major developments in occupation law since the first 
edition. First and most important is the occupation of  Iraq in 2003, to which Benvenisti devotes 
an entire new chapter. Iraq marked the first time since World War II that states had acknowl-
edged their status as occupying powers and the first time the Security Council had pronounced 
in detail on their obligations under occupation law. The occupiers made extraordinary use of  
the legislative authority they granted themselves, reforming virtually every sector of  Iraq’s 
politics, law, and economy. The involvement of  the UK meant that claims under the European 
Convention on Human Rights could at least be attempted, and were in several cases partially 
successful (a development discussed below). In Resolution 1546 the Security Council declared 
that the occupation would end on 30 June 2004, an exercise of  legal fiat seemingly at odds 
with the factual determination usually thought to control the question whether an occupation 
continues.3 Of  equal importance to these legal aspects of  the occupation was the political con-
troversy – and accompanying public scrutiny – that surrounded the Iraq episode. The outpour-
ing of  scholarly commentary on the reforms in occupied Iraq is the best evidence of  its effect of  
bringing occupation law to the fore.4
1 G. von Glahn, The Occupation of  Enemy Territory (1957).
2 U.S. Army Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of  Land Warfare (1956); British Command of  the Army 
Council, III Manual of  Military Law – The Law of  War on Land (1958).
3 SC Res. 1546 (8 June, 2004).
4 See Fox, ‘Transformative Occupation and the Unilateralist Impulse’, 94 IRRC (2012) 237, at 240 n. 15 
(collecting citations).
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The second development is the rise of  norms of  democratic government and accompanying 
notions of  how political power may be legitimately exercised. While the nature and scope of  
the ‘democratic entitlement’5 remain controversial, in the early 21st century one cannot argue 
that international law has remained indifferent to how national governments are selected. 
References to democracy and free and fair elections permeate a variety of  legal regimes and 
have few evident competitors. For occupation law, traditionally focused on maintaining the 
political and legal status quo in the occupied territories, the idea that democratic transitions 
might be a desirable or even necessary goal of  an interim occupation regime is a revolution-
ary notion. But nascent democratic norms may point to a different path, casting occupiers as 
lawful agents of  political liberalization. In Benvenisti’s words, the ‘occupant that respects such 
[human and peoples’] rights and promotes their exercise should therefore not be regarded as 
violator but, to the contrary, as facilitator of  the exercise of  rights recognized by international 
law’ (at 349–350).
The third development is the rise of  post-conflict reconstruction missions authorized by the 
Security Council, the subject of  another new chapter. These missions have often engaged in wide-
ranging political and legal reforms in the affected territories. In Kosovo, for example, which is the 
central case study in the new chapter, UNMIK exercised executive, legislative and judicial power, 
though not very effectively, to tackle ‘[t]he huge task of  reconstructing Kosovo’ (at 281). This 
move to a collective form of  intervention (and in some cases territorial administration) raises the 
question whether the UN missions should be constrained by occupation law. Benvenisti argues 
that simple fairness requires that they should; while missions like UNMIK were given broad polit-
ical responsibilities they remained largely unaccountable for their actions. ‘[I]f  states are subject 
to strict legal and institutional constraints with regard to their treatment of  their own citizens, 
on what grounds should a body that exercises state-like functions be exempted from the same 
constraints in treating foreign nationals?’ (at 293).
The fourth development is jurisprudence holding occupiers accountable, under certain cir-
cumstances, for violating their human rights treaty obligations. While the extra-territorial 
application of  human rights instruments has emerged from a number of  legal sources, includ-
ing the ICJ, the European Court of  Human Rights has led in fashioning a test for whether indi-
viduals are subject to the ‘jurisdiction’ of  human rights treaty parties that is remarkably similar 
to that determining the existence of  an occupation.6 The possibility that occupiers might be obli-
gated to institutionalize human rights guarantees in the legal system of  the states they control 
– in the words of  ICCPR, Article 2 to ‘adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant’ – has informed much of  the recent 
literature on occupation law.
Finally, a series of  developments have served both to clarify opaque aspects of  occupation law 
and to raise its profile. These include a report of  ICRC experts on the state of  contemporary occu-
pation law,7 a revised version of  the UK Military Manual that takes into account the experience 
of  the Iraq occupation,8 important scholarship on the origins of  occupation law,9 several new 
5 The phrase was coined by Thomas Franck: see Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 
86 AJIL (1992) 46.
6 See, e.g., App. No. 55721/07, Al-Skeini et al. v. UK, Judgment, 7 July 2011.
7 International Committee of  the Red Cross, Expert Meeting: Occupation and Other Forms of  Administration 
of  Foreign Territory (2012).
8 UK Ministry of  Defence, The Manual of  the Law of  Armed Conflict (2004).
9 See, e.g., Benvenisti, ‘The Origins of  the Concept of  Belligerent Occupation’, 26 L and History Rev (2008) 
621.
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treatises on the subject,10 and a general outpouring of  scholarly commentary on the contem-
porary meaning of  occupation norms.11
Benvenisti addresses this revival of  occupation law both by expanding chapters present in 
the first edition and by adding new chapters. A new introductory chapter reviews the multiply-
ing sources of  occupation law, which now include not only the Hague Regulations and Fourth 
Geneva Convention but norms on human rights, self-determination, use of  force, and state 
responsibility, among others. A new chapter on the historical origins of  occupation law draws 
on Benvenisti’s own insightful scholarship on the subject.12 Here he introduces a theme to be 
revisited throughout the book: ‘the concept of  occupation can be seen as the mirror-image of  
the concept of  sovereignty’ (at 21). A new chapter on how occupation is to be characterized 
addresses the spatial scope of  occupation, its temporal scope, and the question whether forces 
other than the armies of  other states can occupy a territory. The first edition’s chapter on the 
treaty framework of  occupation law has been replaced by a 40-page chapter on how an occupied 
territory is to be administered. This discussion includes the critical question (addressed further 
below) of  an occupier’s obligation to respect the legal status quo it finds in a territory.
From these historical and conceptual questions the book moves to a review of  case studies. 
These are models of  concise yet intellectually probing analysis. Benvenisti reviews the occupa-
tions of  World Wars I and II, the latter providing an opportunity to revisit the arguments of  
Allied international lawyers as to why the reforms in occupied Germany and Japan were not 
incompatible with Article 43 of  the Hague Regulations, which famously requires occupiers 
to respect the law in place unless ‘absolutely prevented’ from doing so. A chapter on occupa-
tions since the 1970s is updated to include Russia in Georgia, Uganda in the Congo, Turkey 
in Northern Iraq, and the end of  the Indonesian occupation of  East Timor. Further case study 
chapters review the Israeli occupation of  the West Bank and Gaza, the US and UK occupation 
of  Iraq, and the UN’s administration of  Kosovo. These chapters usefully venture well beyond the 
specifics of  each episode and explore critical legal issues they raise. These include the effects of  
transferring administrative authority over a territory to a local entity (the Oslo Accords), the 
effect of  Security Council authorization to reform legal and political institutions (Resolution 
1483 on Iraq), and the susceptibility of  non-state actors to regulation by occupation law (UN 
territorial administrations such as UNMIK). Following these case studies, another new chapter 
examines the effects of  an occupier’s actions in the post-occupation period. The analysis seeks 
to balance, on the one hand, the legitimate expectations of  those who rely on changing legal 
circumstances during an occupation and, on the other, the maxim that no legal consequences 
should flow from an occupier’s illegal acts. A final chapter, updated from the first edition, exam-
ines mechanisms to enforce the law of  occupation. Much is new here, including a review of  
decisions of  the ICJ, European Court of  Human Rights, national courts, and oversight functions 
taken on by UN bodies.
Given that the first edition effectively predated the entire post-Cold War era, one might have 
expected Benvenisti to revise his central claim that occupation law has almost never functioned 
effectively, and certainly not in the manner envisaged by its foundational documents. The occu-
piers of  World Wars I and II committed widespread atrocities and altered life in the territories to 
suit their political advantage. Occupiers after 1945 were less brutal but still dodged legal obli-
gations by uniformly refusing to recognize their status as occupiers – despite their widespread 
ratification of  the Fourth Geneva Convention. Benvenisti has not revised this claim, and his case 
for maintaining a continuing critical attitude toward the effectiveness of  occupation norms 
10 Y. Dinstein, The International Law of  Belligerent Occupation (2009); Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of  
Occupation (2009).
11 See Fox, supra note 3.
12 Benvenisti, supra note 8.
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remains a strong one: ‘[u]sing sophisticated and unsophisticated claims, most recent occupants 
avoided the acknowledgement that their presence on foreign soil was in fact an occupation . . . 
Careful analysis reveals that in all of  the recent cases of  occupation, except for the Israeli control 
over the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, and Iraq (2003–04) the framework 
of  the law of  occupation was not followed even on a de facto basis’ (at 201–202). Indeed, the 
Palestine and Iraq occupations stand as the only examples since World War II where occupiers 
have ‘established a distinct military government over occupied areas under the framework of  the 
law of  occupation’ (at 203).
But the arguable marginalization of  occupation law is a much more complex phenomenon 
in Benvenisti’s telling than simple law-breaking or law avoidance. As noted, Benvenisti links 
changes in occupation law to evolving notions of  sovereignty: ‘changes in the identity of  the 
sovereign (the prince or the people) and its authority (unfettered discretion or subject to human 
rights limitations) indirectly led to changes in the law of  occupation’ (at 348). The evolution of  
occupation law thus cannot be separated from changes in norms limiting or reconceiving the 
legitimate exercise of  political authority. One important example, which Benvenisti addresses 
at several points in the book, is the debate over humanitarian intervention. While formally 
a jus in bello question, the ability of  an occupier to change the human rights practices of  an 
ousted regime is necessarily linked to its jus ad bellum authority to use force to that end. ‘[W]
here the existing political system cannot guarantee protection against governmental persecu-
tion and harsh abuses of  human rights, the occupant may modify existing laws and institutions 
for humanitarian goals. The idea that under certain circumstances a genuine humanitarian 
intervention could effect, if  necessary institutional or even territorial changes in the occupied 
territory is consistent with that claim’ (at 191). Similarly, where an occupied population is enti-
tled to self-determination the occupier necessarily becomes a party to the realization of  that 
right. ‘[T]he intervening state, upon assuming control in the foreign territory, would face the 
choice between confirming to the laws of  the ousted, repressive regime, or assisting the people 
it freed to exercise their right to self-determination’ (at 198). Benvenisti suggests that where 
the right to self-determination is external, an occupier would not act unlawfully if  it facilitated 
the terri tory’s secession (at 198–199). If  the relationship between states and their citizens is a 
constantly evolving set of  principles, then one would certainly expect the relationship between 
citizens and a de facto regime that temporarily assumes control of  a state to evolve as well.
This brings us to the central debate in contemporary occupation law and the single issue to 
which Benvenisti devotes most attention: the scope of  an occupier’s legislative authority. The 
occupation of  Iraq is often described as ‘transformative’, and many have argued since 2003 that 
occupiers have developed the right, and perhaps the duty, to reform laws in the territory that fall 
short of  international standards. This is particularly true where human rights are concerned. 
Many such commentators draw inspiration from the growing number of  UN-authorized post-
conflict reconstruction missions, which in many ways resemble occupations and have uniformly 
pursued liberal democratic reforms.
Article 43 of  the Hague Regulations, in securing the legal status quo unless an occupier is 
‘absolutely prevented’ from respecting the laws in force, conceived of  the occupier as a de facto 
trustee with limited capacity to assume the law-making powers of  the ousted de jure sovereign. 
But Benvenisti notes that occupation law has almost never viewed preserving the rights of  the 
ousted regime as the sole interest to be served. From the beginning, three conflicting sets of  
interests have been present: those of  the occupier in maintaining security, those of  the ousted 
regime in securing the legal status quo ante bellum pending its return, and those of  the local popu-
lation (at 69). But even as the Hague Regulations were being drafted, the idea of  the occupier as 
an impartial trustee was coming under pressure that would only increase over time. The rise of  
the modern welfare state inserted governments into national economic life. A heightened aware-
ness of  civil liberties, while slow in coming, both restrained the coercive measures available to 
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occupiers and required them to serve, in certain circumstances, as affirmative guardians of  pro-
tected rights. And ousted regimes increasingly remained ousted at war’s end, rendering pro-
tection of  their interests somewhat pointless. Benvenisti notes that by the time of  the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, the law had rather clearly changed its ‘emphasis from the political interests 
of  the ousted regime to the protection of  the population in the enemy’s hands’ (at 72).
Benvenisti is unconcerned that these trends may fall foul of  Article 43’s ‘unless absolutely 
prevented’ dictum; that requirement, he argues, ‘has no meaning of  its own, since the occu-
pant is almost never absolutely prevented, in the technical sense, from respecting them [exist-
ing laws]. This phrase becomes meaningful only when it is linked to the considerations that the 
occupants are entitled or required to weigh while contemplating the desirability of  change vis-
à-vis the interest in stability and respect for the status quo’ (at 90). These ‘considerations’ are 
now substantial, drawing normative strength from the omnipresence of  human rights in all 
areas of  international law and the rise of  notions of  popular sovereignty. Thus, Benvenisti finds 
‘an obligation not to enforce local norms that are incompatible with the obligations to protect 
the human rights of  the occupied population’ (at 92). Even wholesale regime change to create 
democratic institutions can be proper, as he suggests was true in the case of  the US intervention 
in Panama (at 184). Such changes can be formally justified under Article 43 as measures nec-
essary to restore ‘public order and safety’. But for Benvenisti the real touchstone is approval by 
the local population, which in an age of  liberal democratic ascendance can effectively validate 
sweeping legislative reforms:
There can equally be situations where the ousted government has lost its right to revert to its 
prior possessions due to its own illegal policies toward the inhabitants of  the occupied terri-
tory. The advent of  human and people’s rights has also modified that side of  the sovereign-
to-sovereign equation that has informed the law of  occupation. The occupant that respects 
such rights and promotes their exercise should therefore not be regarded as a violator but, to 
the contrary, as facilitator of  the exercise of  rights recognized by international law. Because 
of  the inherent suspicion of  [an] occupant’s intention, the legal validity of  the arrange-
ments it facilitated will depend on indigenous endorsement through free and fair processes 
[at 349–350].
Thus, while US-led regime change in Grenada in 1983 ‘constituted an infringement of  the law 
of  occupation’, that violation was ‘healed by the democratic process that took place on the island 
through which the public could express its endorsement of  the new political system’ (at 183). 
The transformative occupation of  Iraq was deficient mainly because of  insufficient popular 
consultation (at 272–273). Further, if  popularly endorsed liberal reforms are legitimate for the 
duration of  the occupation, they are also legitimate for the post-occupation period. The obliga-
tion to ensure public order ‘also includes the duty to ensure that public order and civil life do not 
crumble once the occupant has left’ (at 274).
None of  this is to suggest that Benvenisti possesses a blind faith in the humanity of  occupiers. 
International law should assume that ‘an occupant which is left without external supervision 
would tend to advance its own interests, even at the expense of  the interests of  the occupied 
population’ (at 318). Thus, ‘a healthy suspicion in the occupant’s motives should always inform 
a review of  its policies’ (at 349). The human rights protections of  the Fourth Geneva Convention 
would proscribe an occupier’s repressive acts. Benvenisti’s carefully calibrated expansion of  leg-
islative authority is presumably meant to address a ‘transformative’ occupier that purports to 
advance individual rights and the rule of  law.
Viewing occupation as, in part, an opportunity to promote liberal democratic governance is 
certainly in keeping with many trends in contemporary international law. But it runs counter 
to another: the multilateralization of  all aspects of  armed conflict, especially the post-conflict 
phase. Since the early 1990s the Security Council has authorized an extraordinary series of  
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missions to states emerging from (mostly) civil wars, missions that share much of  the reform-
ist ethos of  transformative occupations. Benvenisti carefully reviews this record, focusing, as 
noted, on Kosovo where the Council issued perhaps its most far-reaching authorization for social 
change. If  an opportunity exists to advance human rights, democratic governance, and the rule 
of  law multilaterally, why expand opportunities to do so unilaterally by expanding the preroga-
tives of  state occupiers? Armed with this authority, what incentive would an intervening state 
then have to seek Security Council approval for its transformative agenda?
More generally, if  certain occupiers may acquire much of  a de jure sovereign’s legislative 
power, what separates occupation so-conceived from annexation? Benvenisti would surely reply 
that the line between those two ideas becomes a pointless formalism if, as he advocates, reform 
during an occupation is designed with substantial local input and then ratified in free and fair 
elections. ‘Sovereignty’ is now increasingly an idea of  power vested in citizens, and it is their 
voice that would inform the legislative acts of  occupiers and the government of  a post-occupa-
tion state. No residual ‘sovereign prerogatives’ would be usurped in such a scenario.
This may well be the direction in which occupation law is headed, though apart from Iraq 
it is difficult to find cases in which unilateral occupiers have pursued liberal democratic trans-
formations that are even nominally vetted with the local population. And perhaps the high bar 
Benvenisti sets for legitimate transformation would disqualify the acts of  most reform-minded 
occupiers, thus leaving Council authorization under Chapter VII of  the Charter the only possible 
option. But if, to paraphrase Richard Nixon, we are all democrats now, surely most occupiers will 
announce their intention to promote human rights and popular sovereignty – whether sincerely 
or not – as soon as they attain effective control of  a territory. At that point, international law can 
either insist that they seek Security Council authorization despite their stated good intentions, 
or it can wait to see if  they make good on their promises. A strong version of  the conservationist 
principle would promote the former course. If  that is no longer the law, as Benvenisti suggests, 
one hopes the latter course will turn out for the best.
Gregory H. Fox 
Professor of  Law and Director, Program for International  
Legal Studies, Wayne State University Law School
Email: gfox@wayne.edu
doi:10.1093/ejil/cht003
Anthony Cullen. The Concept of  Non-International Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Pp. 219. £62.00. ISBN: 9780521760485.
The objective of  Anthony Cullen’s work is to ‘remedy some of  the confusion that exists sur-
rounding distinctions that are used to differentiate between different types of  non- international 
armed conflict’ (at 3). He works towards developing a framework for the characterization of  
armed conflicts. The author is a research fellow at the Lauterpacht Centre for International 
Law and is participating in the joint British Red Cross and International Committee of  the Red 
Cross project to update the collection of  practice underlying the ICRC’s study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law.1
Application of  humanitarian law to non-international armed conflict is a timely subject in the 
present political context. One needs only to point to discussions about the so-called global war on 
1 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 Vols, (2009).
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